The Rebirth of History: Part I

“Proponents of identity politics tended to push for these historically marginalized groups, in all their intersectional complexity, to have a greater say in the cultural and political dynamics of the day.”

Throughout my childhood, the end of the Cold War had led many to believe that sincere ideological conflicts were on their way out.  The old isms which had rocked the twentieth century, and which I had been taught to regard with skepticism and even dismissal, seemed to many like relics of an earlier time. Nationalism, fanaticism, ethnocentrism, racism and so on, all appeared to be losing force. This was well captured in texts like Francis Fukuyama’s famous The End of History and the Last Man which argued that one way or another, a relatively tolerant form of liberal democracy and globalizing capitalism was likely the way of the future.  With the rise and fall of fascism and communism in the last century, history as a conflict between universal ideologies competing for global dominance had reached its apex.

Of course, Fukuyama’s argument was always more cautious than its reputation. As he points out in his brilliant recent book Identity, Fukuyama was always very aware that thymos—roughly translated from Greek as the spirit’s desire for recognition, and for glory relative to others—remained a prominent feature of human psychology.  In The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama prophetically warned that the desire of those on the political right for greater recognition and struggle may one day lead to the rebirth of history. But for a long time, it seemed like these were idle concerns.  Some argued that the 9/11 attacks and the inauguration of the War on Terror indicated the rebirth of history after a momentary lull. But few actually believed that. We generally felt that United States would eventually elect a new President and cease its violent quest for what Michael Ignatieff once called a liberal “empire lite.” It would settle into its role as a relatively benign hegemon using soft power to push for greater internationalization and inclusion. Russia would continue its path to greater democratization and liberalization. China’s economic prosperity and entry into the digital community would lead to the Communist party gradually reforming.  India would take its rightful place as a great power and the world’s largest liberal democracy.  The European Union would continue to expand, perhaps even including the Ukraine, Turkey, and in our wildest dreams, even Russia.  Proponents like Habermas were especially optimistic about the global ramifications of the latter development, hoping that the European project of promoting international law and the softening of borders would serve as a model for other states.  And many of us in Canada felt that our country’s open—if often troubled—embrace of multiculturalism and the withering away of nationalist sentiments would prove an inspiration for countries into the twenty-first century.

Looking back, much of this seems remarkably naïve.  One of the primary goals of political analysis must become understanding how such a dramatic shift occurred