Standing By Our Criticisms of Jordan Peterson

“If Peterson manages to dispense good advice in spite of muddled philosophical and political reasoning, this attests to his psychological acuity. But it does not magically redeem his intellectual output.”

Introduction

We appreciated much in Tony D. Senatore’s article for Merion West, “The Best Argument For Jordan Peterson: My Friend, Fred.” In particular we empathize deeply with Senatore’s story about his friend Fred, whose wife is suffering from frontal lobe dementia—and how Peterson’s lectures about how to handle adversity proved edifying. Life isn’t truly easy for anyone, and we don’t begrudge anyone for seeking help when needed. If anything, the capacity to do so is a sign of considerable strength and depth of feeling. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Senatore does not address the content of our book, Myth and Mayhem: A Leftist Critique of Jordan Peterson, specifically (indeed, it has not even been published!). Rather, it addresses the idea of our book as presented in a preview article, with Senatore’s argument amounting to the claim that any criticism of Peterson must account for his “track record of helping those in need.”

It is somewhat difficult to assess Senatore’s claims. This is because we are dealing with different sets of issues. Myth and Mayhem analyzes the arguments Peterson leverages in support of various philosophical and political positions. What it does not analyze is the ostensibly enriching properties of his self-help work (difficult as these are to assess). Evaluating the strength of Peterson’s arguments, of course, does not require taking into consideration whether his advice has helped people. As this is our goal, it is necessary to remark that—while moving—the account furnished by Senatore to support his claim of the positive effects of Peterson’s work has little bearing on said work.

Evaluating Peterson’s Impact

“I discovered that beliefs make the world, in a very real way-that beliefs are the world, in a more than metaphysical sense. This discovery has not turned me into a moral relativist however. I have become convinced that the world-that is-belief is orderly; that there are universal moral absolutes (although these are structured such that a diverse range of human opinions remains both possible and beneficial. I believe that individuals and societies who flout these absolutes—in ignorance or in willful opposition—are doomed to misery and eventual dissolution. I learned that the meanings of the most profound substrata of belief systems can be rendered explicitly comprehensible, even to the skeptical rational thinker—and that, so rendered, can be experienced as fascinating, profound and necessary. I learned why people wage war—why the desire to maintain, protect and expand the domain of belief motivates even the most incomprehensible acts of group-fostered oppression and cruelty—and what might be done to ameliorate this tendency, despite is universality. I learned, finally, that the terrible aspect of life might actually be a necessary precondition for the existence of life, and that it is possible to regard that precondition, in consequence, as comprehensible and acceptable.”