There Is No Universal "We"

For those who claim to be interested in philosophical and cultural subjects, and perhaps even in making a name for themselves in that arena, it is extremely important to question the premises of any discussion that a passionate interlocutor would offer. I was once, for instance, speaking with a friend of mine about the Israel-Gaza war, and my friend, though of course supportive of the Israeli position, asked: But what are we to do about the innocents in Gaza who did not choose this war? And I replied that, while no one is advocating for the killing of innocents, I could not accept the premise of the We in the question, because this word here assumes a Western universalistic egalitarian ethos that, in turn, relies on a number of philosophical principles that I reject—the ultimate result being that, while we might have sympathy for those innocents, it is not the responsibility of the West to help them.1

This is not a question of selfishness or of refusing to be of service to others, when possible, but rather of how we relate to the rest of the world, and why we relate as we do. Is the world constituted only by us, or by us and them? If the latter, when are we no longer we—where do they begin? And how much of ourselves does altruism require us to sacrifice?

"The squeamishness many Western conservatives feel about abandoning the universalistic We never fails to impress."

So one would do well to ask what moral principles form the basis of the desire to help the innocents of Gaza. One should inquire: Why is this question of what we are to do about those innocents even being asked? Why does someone even feel this type of responsibility? Perhaps the answer would be: because of a basic humanitarianism. Very well, then one must inquire: Why does someone feel this humanitarianism? Is it because he thinks that every human life is sacred? Well, where, then, does that thought come from? It is not an automatic or necessarily natural feeling, contrary to what Kant thought (famously in the conclusion to the Critique of Practical Reason, but in many passages); rather, it must be inculcated—or if it is natural, the joy in others’ suffering and in inflicting pain is also natural. Someone else might answer that the thought of innocent suffering simply makes him uncomfortable, or induces a feeling of moral disturbance. But again: Why?

These are some of the complex issues that often hide behind seemingly innocuous statements or queries. And they constitute the nexus of questions by which we ought to reject the We, the universalistic egalitarian ethos, in my friend’s question. There are of course more political reasons for not accepting this We, outside of philosophy. For example, the universalistic We does not exist to those we would be helping, and it would therefore be counterproductive to have it exist for us. And introducing a large number of Islamic refugees and migrants into Western countries is a disastrous policy, as anyone familiar with Western and Northern Europe’s cities could attest. But these are topics I have dealt with in some detail elsewhere, and I should here like to focus on the philosophical problems with the universalistic We.