The Islamic Republic Cannot Be “Defanged”

For decades, Western policymakers have returned, almost reflexively, to a familiar question: Can the Islamic Republic of Iran be contained, deterred, or gradually moderated? The latest iteration of this debate—whether to “defang” Iran’s military capabilities or to contemplate outright regime change—suggests a choice. In reality, it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. The distinction assumes that the regime’s behavior can be separated from its nature. Yet the Islamic Republic is not a conventional state whose excesses can be disciplined through calibrated pressure. It is an ideological system, born out of revolution in 1979, whose legitimacy has long depended on resistance—externally against perceived enemies, and internally against dissent. Its foreign policy is not simply strategic; it is doctrinal.

The concept of “defanging” Iran typically focuses on limiting its missile arsenal, constraining its nuclear ambitions, and disrupting its network of regional proxies. These objectives are tactically sound and, in some cases, necessary. But they risk addressing symptoms rather than structure. Iran’s military posture is not an instrument of statecraft but is core to the regime’s identity. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates do not merely project power but they embody the revolutionary logic that sustains the system itself. That alone goes a long way toward explaining why decades of pressure have produced, at best, partial and temporary results. Sanctions have imposed real costs but have not altered the regime’s trajectory. Diplomatic agreements have delayed escalation but have not transformed underlying intentions. Targeted military actions have disrupted operations without dismantling the broader architecture.

Like other ideologically driven regimes in history, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated a capacity to absorb pressure while preserving its core.

The experience of Cold War containment offers a useful, if imperfect, parallel. The Soviet regime did not reform itself into benign coexistence; instead, it eventually collapsed under the weight of its own structural limits. The question, then, is whether a similar logic applies to Iran. One risk of a “defanging” strategy is that it creates an unstable equilibrium: a regime whose capabilities are constrained but whose governing ideology remains intact. History suggests that such systems do not necessarily become more predictable under pressure. On the contrary, they may become more prone to asymmetric escalation, seeking to reassert relevance through indirect means. In Iran’s case, this pattern is already visible in its reliance on proxy warfare and regional destabilization.

"A strategy that aims only to modify the regime’s behavior risks prolonging a cycle of confrontation without addressing its source."

There is, just as importantly, an internal dimension that strategic discussions tend to understate. The Islamic Republic has, for over four decades, maintained power through a combination of ideological control and coercive force. From the post-revolutionary purges of the 1980s to the more recent suppression of protest movements, the regime has consistently responded to domestic challenges with repression rather than adaptation. The gap between state and society has not narrowed. If anything, it has widened.

At the same time, Iranian society itself has evolved. It is younger, more connected, and more politically conscious than at any point in the regime’s history. The recurring waves of protest—from the Green Movement in 2009 to the demonstrations that erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody on September 16, 2022, and continued well into 2023—suggest not marginal dissent but a persistent and broad-based rejection of the system’s constraints. These movements have not yet produced political change, but they have revealed its possibility. This leads to a more difficult question: If the regime’s external behavior is inseparable from its internal structure, can lasting stability be achieved without systemic transformation?

The term “regime change” is often burdened by the legacy of past interventions, particularly in Iraq and Libya, where external action produced unintended and destabilizing consequences. These examples serve as cautionary reminders of the limits of forceful imposition. Yet they do not resolve the underlying issue. Iran differs in important respects: It possesses a strong national identity, a long historical continuity, and a society that has repeatedly signaled its desire for change from within. The implication is not that transformation can be engineered from the outside but that it cannot be indefinitely deferred. A strategy that aims only to modify the regime’s behavior risks prolonging a cycle of confrontation without addressing its source. By contrast, recognizing the necessity of systemic change shifts the focus toward long-term alignment: weakening the structures that sustain authoritarian control while strengthening the conditions under which internal change becomes possible.

Clarity, in this context, matters. When the international community signals that its objective is limited to behavioral adjustment, it effectively reassures the regime that its survival is not in question. And as long as survival remains secure, the incentive for transformation is minimal. Strategic ambiguity, often intended to preserve flexibility, can instead reinforce stagnation.

None of this suggests that change will be immediate or orderly. The eventual transition of the Soviet Union, often cited in hindsight as inevitable, was in fact uncertain and uneven while it unfolded. Iran will likely follow a similar path. But the alternative—a continuation of periodic crises, managed tensions, and incremental escalation—offers little prospect of durable stability.

The debate, then, is not simply about methods, but about ends. To “defang” Iran without addressing the nature of the system is to accept its continuity. To consider regime change is to acknowledge that the problem may not lie in what the Islamic Republic does, but in what it is. If that is the case, the strategic horizon becomes clearer, even if the path remains difficult.

Iran may not be indefinitely manageable. And a more stable future may depend, ultimately, on something more fundamental than containment.

Pierre Rehov is a writer, reporter, and documentary filmmaker. His latest film is Pogrom(s).